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 NOTE 
Civil or Criminal?: Deciding Whether a Law 
May Be Applied Retrospectively Yet 
Constitutionally in Missouri 
State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
TIMOTHY M. GUNTLI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of every state ban 
ex post facto laws, only Missouri and a minority of other states prohibit en-
actment of laws retrospective in their operation.1  Understanding the differ-
ence between the two types of laws can be difficult at first glance.  According 
to the Supreme Court of Missouri, an ex post facto law is one that “provides 
for punishment for an act that was not punishable when it was committed or 
that imposes an additional punishment to that in effect at the time the act was 
committed.”2  In comparison, a law retrospective in its operation is “one 
which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disa-
bility with respect to transactions or considerations already past.  It must give 
to something already done a different effect from that which it had when the 
act transpired.”3 
An example should help to clarify the difference.  Suppose that a de-
fendant was convicted of a felony in the year 2002, at which time the state 
had not enacted a statute prohibiting convicted felons from possessing fire-
arms.4  Suppose further that the state enacts such a statute in 2004, two years 
after the defendant’s conviction, and charges the defendant with violating the 
statute in 2005.  Such a statute would not be an ex post facto law because it 
would not actually punish the conduct leading to the defendant’s original 
conviction that occurred before the firearm statute’s enactment.  Rather, the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Missouri School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Professor Paul Litton for his insightful observations and the staff of the Missouri Law 
Review for their editorial assistance. 
 1. State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).  Other states 
prohibiting enactment of retrospective laws include Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Mar-
yland, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas.  See id. at 432 n.3. 
 2. State v. Harris, 414 S.W.3d 447, 449-50 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (quoting R.W. 
v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2005) (en banc)). 
 3. Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Turney, 183 S.W. 12 (Mo. 1911). 
 4. This example is loosely based on State v. Honeycutt, which is discussed infra 
Part III.B. 
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statute would punish the defendant’s possession of a firearm, which occurred 
after enactment of the statute.5  However, the statute would be a retrospective 
law because it would impose a new disability (i.e., a prohibition on firearm 
possession) upon the defendant due to his past felony conviction. 
Although ex post facto laws and retrospective laws are similar concepts, 
the distinction can have an important impact on any given case in Missouri 
because the state constitution’s ban on retrospectively operational laws ap-
plies only to civil – and not criminal – laws.6  Thus, a party challenging a law 
as unconstitutional due to retrospective operation must first show that the law 
is civil in nature.7  The distinction between criminal and civil laws is obvious 
in some cases, but the line can become quite blurry in the context of sex of-
fender registration and restriction statutes.8 
Although the Supreme Court of Missouri recognized the difference be-
tween ex post facto laws and retrospectively operative laws long ago, the 
advent of sex offender statutes and their unique pseudo-criminal characteris-
tics have challenged the court to delineate and apply criteria for deciding 
whether a particular provision is civil and, therefore, subject to the prohibi-
tion of retrospective laws.9  Even though the Supreme Court of the United 
States provided substantial aid for this task with its decision in Smith v. Doe 
in 2003,10 the application of Smith’s standard still leaves plenty of room for 
reasonable minds to disagree, as recently demonstrated by a divided Supreme 
Court of Missouri in State v. Wade.11 
This Note begins by discussing the facts and holding of Wade.12  Next, 
this Note examines generally the legal background and history of bans on ex 
post facto laws and on laws retrospective in their operation in Missouri.13  
Then, this Note explains recent precedent regarding such bans, particularly in 
 
 5. See Harris, 414 S.W.3d at 450. 
 6. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 432.  Thus, if the firearm statute in the above example 
were deemed a “criminal” statute, it would be constitutional in Missouri.  However, if 
it were deemed a “civil” statute, it would be unconstitutional. 
 7. See id. at 435. 
 8. In response to the 1994 sexual assault and murder of seven-year-old Megan 
Kanka by a neighbor who, unknown to the victim’s family, had previously been con-
victed of sex offenses against children, legislatures across the country began enacting 
laws that imposed “a variety of reporting, residential, employment, and other similar 
restrictions on persons convicted of a wide array of sex and other related offenses.”  
Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial 
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 348 (2014); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 
84, 89 (2003).  Often colloquially known as “Megan’s Laws,” a version of these laws 
has now been enacted by all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 90. 
 9. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 10. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-94, 97. 
 11. See infra Parts III.B, IV. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
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the context of sex offender registration statutes.14  After the discussion of 
precedent, this Note explores the analyses of the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions in Wade.15  Finally, this Note concludes with a critique of 
these analyses in the instant decision and contemplates the future effects of 
the court’s decision.16 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
This appeal arose from three consolidated cases of different defendants: 
Michael Wade, Jason Reece Peterson, and Edwin Carey.17  In the late 1990s, 
all three men had been convicted of, or had pleaded guilty to, various sex 
crimes, and each was required to register as a sex offender.18  Beginning in 
2010 and continuing through the summer of 2011, each of the defendants was 
charged with violating Missouri Revised Statute Section 566.150, which pro-
hibits any individual who has pleaded guilty to, or been convicted of, various 
sex offenses from “knowingly be[ing] present in or loiter[ing] within five 
hundred feet of any real property comprising any public park with playground 
equipment or a public swimming pool.”19  At the time of the charges, each 
defendant was in full compliance with all sex offender registration require-
ments.20 
Wade filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in his case, arguing that 
Section 566.150 was unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to him.21  
Wade claimed that the charge violated Article I, Section 13 of the Missouri 
Constitution, which prohibits enactment of any such retrospective law.22  The 
trial court overruled his motion, and Wade waived his right to a jury trial.23  
Wade was convicted after a bench trial, and the court sentenced him to three 
years’ imprisonment.24  Wade appealed this sentence.25 
 
 14. See infra Part III.B-C. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429, 430 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 18. Id. at 430-32.  Wade had pleaded guilty to statutory sodomy, child molesta-
tion, and sexual abuse in the first degree and was sentenced to participate in the 
state’s Sexual Offender Assessment Unit program.  Id. at 430.  Peterson was convict-
ed of indecent behavior with a juvenile in Louisiana but had moved to Missouri.  Id. 
at 431.  Carey had pleaded guilty to statutory rape.  Id. 
 19. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.150.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 20. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 430-32. 
 21. Id. at 431. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  The court then suspended execution of Wade’s sentence and placed him 
on five years’ probation.  Id. 
 25. Id. 
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Peterson also filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him as uncon-
stitutionally retrospective in violation of Article I, Section 13.26  The State 
responded by arguing that the constitution’s ban on retrospective laws applied 
only to civil rights and proceedings – not to criminal proceedings.27  The 
State further argued that even if the retrospective ban applied to criminal stat-
utes, the statute neither deprived Peterson of any of his rights nor did it “con-
fer any additional duty, obligation, or disability on Peterson to comply with 
the statute.”28  The trial court, assuming that the constitutional ban on retro-
spective laws was not limited to civil statutes, sustained Peterson’s motion to 
dismiss and found that Section 566.150 was unconstitutionally retrospective 
as applied to Peterson.29  The State appealed this decision.30 
Carey also filed a motion to dismiss in his case, alleging that Section 
566.150 was unconstitutional as applied to him because it “imposed a new 
obligation that was not present at the time of his conviction” in violation of 
the constitutional ban on retrospective laws.31  Carey argued in particular that 
Section 566.150 became effective twelve years after his guilty plea and that 
laws similar to Section 566.150 had been found unconstitutionally retrospec-
tive as applied to offenders convicted before the enactment of the law.32  The 
State responded by arguing that Article I, Section 13’s prohibition against 
retrospective laws did not apply to criminal laws but only to civil rights and 
remedies.33  The trial court sustained Carey’s motion and dismissed the in-
formation.34  The State appealed the trial court’s dismissal.35 
On appeal of the three consolidated cases, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri affirmed Wade’s conviction and reversed the lower courts’ dismissals 
of Peterson’s and Carey’s charges.36  The court, reaffirming that the constitu-
tional prohibition on retrospective laws did not apply to criminal statutes, 
held that Section 566.150 was a criminal law and, therefore, was not invalid 
under the constitutional prohibition.37 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part begins with a general overview of Missouri precedent discuss-
ing the distinction between ex post facto laws and laws retrospective in their 
operation.  The latter half of this Part details more recent precedent regarding 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 432. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 430. 
 37. Id. 
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that distinction in an era of sex offender registration statutes.  Finally, this 
Part concludes with a brief discussion of recent precedent’s impact on the 
decision in Wade. 
A.  Ex Post Facto Laws and Laws Retrospective in Their Operation 
The U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of every state forbid ex post 
facto laws.38  However, very few state constitutions proscribe the enactment 
of laws retrospective in their operation.39  Among that small number of states 
is Missouri, which provides under Article I, Section 13 of its current constitu-
tion that “no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, 
or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special 
privileges or immunities, can be enacted.”40 
The difference between the prohibition on laws retrospective in opera-
tion and the prohibition on ex post facto laws has been noted at least as far 
back as 1877, when the Supreme Court of Missouri considered the issue in Ex 
parte Bethurum.41  In Bethurum, the petitioner contested an amendment to 
Missouri’s habeas corpus act that gave the court power to rectify judgments 
in criminal cases that erroneously stated the length or place of an incarcera-
tion sentencing.42  The petitioner challenged the amendment and included 
arguments that it was an ex post facto law and that it was a law retrospective 
in its application.43 
In denying all of the petitioner’s arguments, the court held that a “‘law 
retrospective in its operation,’ as the phrase is employed in our bill of rights, 
is one which relates to civil rights, and proceedings in civil causes.”44  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent to 
demonstrate that “[t]he terms ex post facto and retrospective . . . had acquired 
. . . definite, legal meaning[s], long before the adoption of [Missouri’s] con-
stitution”45 and that each term had a history of relating exclusively to either 
criminal or civil actions, respectively.46  The court further clarified that “there 
can be no doubt that the phrase ‘law retrospective in its operation,’ as used in 
 
 38. Id. at 432. 
 39. Id.  For an example of the distinction between ex post facto and retrospec-
tively operational laws, see supra Part I. 
 40. MO. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 41. 66 Mo. 545 (Mo. 1877). 
 42. Id. at 547-48. 
 43. Id. at 547.  The constitutional provision prohibiting ex post facto laws and 
laws retrospective in operation in effect at the time was Article II, Section 15, which 
is essentially the same as the current provision.  MO. CONST. art. II, § 15 (1875) 
(providing that “no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or 
retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or 
immunities, can be passed by the General Assembly”). 
 44. Bethurum, 66 Mo. at 550. 
 45. Id. at 548 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)). 
 46. See id. at 549-50. 
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the bill of rights, has no application to crimes and punishments, or criminal 
procedure, and [the act at issue] is neither an ex post facto law nor a law ret-
rospective in its operation.”47  The decision in Bethurum set the foundation 
for the Supreme Court of Missouri’s future decisions, particularly those inter-
preting how Article I, Section 13’s ban on retrospective laws relates to sex 
offender statutes.48 
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered the issue of a retro-
spective sex offender restriction statute in R.L. v. State of Missouri Depart-
ment of Corrections.49  In R.L., the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted 
enticement of a child and was required to register as a sex offender.50  At the 
time he pleaded guilty, there was no statute in Missouri restricting where he 
could live based upon his status as a sex offender.51  However, six months 
after his conviction, the legislature enacted a statute that prohibited certain 
sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of a public school.52  R.L. had 
lived at his residence for eight years prior to the enactment of the statute.53  
R.L. filed a petition for declaratory judgment, alleging that the new statute 
was unconstitutionally retrospective in its application.54  The trial court 
agreed.55  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri, presuming that the stat-
ute was civil, affirmed the decision and held that the statute was impermissi-
bly retrospective in application because it “create[d] a new obligation, im-
pose[d] a new duty, or attache[d] a new disability with respect to transactions 
or considerations already past.”56 
In 2010, two years after R.L. was decided, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri was faced with two additional challenges to statutes alleged to be un-
constitutional as-applied when it decided F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff’s 
Department.57  The first defendant in F.R. challenged an amended version of 
the statute at issue in R.L., and, for the same reasons as in R.L., the court 
found in favor of the defendant.58  The second defendant challenged the con-
stitutional validity of another statute, which prohibited convicted sex offend-
ers from going outside, turning on outdoor lights, and handing out candy on 
 
 47. Id. at 552-53. 
 48. See State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429, 432-33 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (citing and 
discussing the impact of Bethurum); State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 416-22 
(Mo. 2013) (en banc) (citing and discussing the impact of Bethurum). 
 49. R.L. v. State Dep’t of Corr., 245 S.W.3d 236, 236 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 237 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 566.147 (Supp. 2006)). 
 53. Id. at 236. 
 54. Id. at 237. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (quoting Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. v. Turney, 138 S.W. 12, 16 (Mo. 
1911)); see also State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 423 (Mo. 2013) (en banc); infra 
notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
 57. 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 58. Id. at 58; see also R.L., 245 S.W.3d at 237. 
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Halloween while requiring them to post a sign stating “no candy or treats at 
this residence.”59  Just as with the 1,000-foot-residence requirement statute, 
the court, again presuming the statute to be civil, held that because the de-
fendant had been convicted and sentenced before the statute was enacted, the 
statute was unconstitutionally retrospective in its operation as applied to the 
defendant.60  Noting the principle that Article I, Section 13 “bars enactment 
of laws that impose a new obligation, duty or disability on matters already 
legally and finally settled,” the court found that the Halloween statute, which 
was enacted some eighteen years after the defendant’s conviction, imposed a 
new obligation, duty, or disability for the conviction and, therefore, was un-
constitutional as applied.61 
B.  State v. Honeycutt & Smith v. Doe: Reexamining R.L., F.R., and 
Bethurum 
More than a century after it was decided, Bethurum’s key principle re-
garding the difference between ex post facto and retrospective laws was reaf-
firmed and expounded upon in the 2013 decision of State v. Honeycutt, in 
which the Supreme Court of Missouri explicitly held that “Article I, Section 
13’s ban on the passage of any law retrospective in its operation does not 
apply to criminal laws.”62  In Honeycutt, the State charged the defendant as a 
prior and persistent offender with stealing a firearm and unlawful possession 
of a firearm under a state statute providing that “a person commits the crime 
of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person knowingly has any firearm 
in his or her possession and . . . has previously been convicted of any felony 
under [state law].”63  The defendant had previously been convicted of felony 
possession of a controlled substance in September 2002.64 
Honeycutt filed a motion to dismiss the firearm possession indictment, 
arguing that when he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, 
the version of the firearm-felony-possession statute in effect in 2002 made it 
a crime only for a person convicted of a “dangerous felony”65 to possess a 
concealable firearm.66  He then argued that because possession of a controlled 
substance did not fall into the “dangerous felony” category, his controlled 
substance possession conviction did not prohibit him from possessing a fire-
 
 59. F.R., 301 S.W.3d at 58. 
 60. Id.; see also Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 423; infra notes 78-79 and accompa-
nying text. 
 61. F.R., 301 S.W.3d at 61-62. 
 62. 421 S.W.3d at 413. 
 63. Id. at 413 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) (Supp. 2012)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Examples of felonies in this statutorily created category include, among 
others, the following: kidnapping, second-degree murder, and first-degree arson, 
assault, rape, sodomy, elder abuse, domestic assault, and robbery.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
556.061(8) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 66. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 413. 
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arm.67  Because the legislature did not amend the firearm possession statute 
until 2008 to make it a crime for a person convicted of any felony to possess 
a firearm, the defendant argued that the 2008 amendment, as applied to him 
and his 2002 conviction, violated Article I, Section 13’s ban on retrospective 
laws.68  The State countered that the ban on retrospective laws had no appli-
cation to criminal laws because it was limited to civil rights and remedies.69  
The trial court dismissed the indictment, and the State appealed.70 
The Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately upheld the principle that “the 
constitutional prohibition against enacting a law ‘retrospective in its opera-
tion’ applies only to laws affecting civil rights and remedies and was never 
intended to apply to criminal statutes.”71  In reaching its holding, the court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the word “retrospective” should be 
given its “plain, literal meaning,” noting that such a restrictive interpretation 
“would swallow the [ex post facto] clause of Article I, Section 13, which ap-
plies solely to criminal laws,” thus rendering the ex post facto clause “mere 
surplusage.”72  The court then discussed the legislative debates and intent 
behind the adoption of the ban on retrospective laws and reiterated the princi-
ple embraced in Bethurum that the terms ex post facto and “retrospective” had 
long held distinct, definite legal meanings.73  Specifically, the court noted that 
ex post facto was “a technical legal term relating exclusively to crimes, pun-
ishments, and criminal procedure.”74 
As an alternative argument, Honeycutt alleged that the court in R.L. and 
F.R. had implicitly overruled Bethurum, contending that because the statutes 
in those cases had carried criminal penalties, those holdings implicitly ex-
tended the application of the ban on retrospective laws to criminal statutes.75  
The court responded first by noting its general presumption against overrul-
ing precedent sub silentio76 as a principle of stare decisis.77  The court then 
explained that, in deciding R.L. and F.R., it had presumed, based on the issues 
raised by the parties and previous interpretations of sex offender registration 
statutes as being civil laws, that the invalidated statutes in R.L. and F.R. were 
civil in nature.78  Simply put, the court reasoned, because the parties in R.L. 
and F.R. had not argued that Article I, Section 13 applied to criminal laws, 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 414. 
 72. Id. at 415. 
 73. Id. at 415-16. 
 74. Id. at 416 (citing Ex parte Bethurum, 66 Mo. 545, 548-49 (Mo. 1877) (dis-
cussing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798))). 
 75. Id. at 422. 
 76. “Sub silentio is defined as ‘without notice being taken or without making a 
particular point of the matter in question.’”  Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 423. 
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the court had not issued a holding on that particular issue (i.e., R.L. and F.R. 
“[did] not stand for the proposition that the ‘retrospective laws’ clause of 
Article I, Section 13 applies to criminal laws”).79  However, Honeycutt’s de-
cision that Article I, Section 13’s prohibition against laws retrospective in 
their operation does not apply to criminal laws resolved only one of the issues 
in that case; the court next had to determine whether the firearm possession 
statute was a criminal or civil law.80 
In deciding whether the law was criminal or civil, the court applied the 
test first explicated in 2003 by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Smith v. Doe.81  Smith was crucial in the Honeycutt court’s analysis because it 
was the first time that the Court had considered whether a sex offender regis-
tration statute constituted retroactive punishment prohibited by the ex post 
facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.82  In Smith, convicted sex offenders 
challenged the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”), which 
retroactively required convicted sex offenders to register with law enforce-
ment agencies, making a great deal of the offenders’ personal information 
public.83  ASORA was enacted after the challengers’ convictions and releases 
from prison and rehabilitation, but it nevertheless applied to them.84  The 
challengers argued that ASORA was unconstitutional as applied to them be-
cause it violated the ex post facto clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.85  Relying on precedent, the Court indicated that if the legislature had 
intended a punitive effect through enactment, the statute would be subject to 
the ex post facto clause.86  However, enactment with civil intent would save 
the statute from ex post facto clause application unless the statute was “so 
punitive either in purpose or effect” that it must be considered criminal.87  
The Court held that ASORA was non-punitive and, therefore, not subject to 
the ex post facto clause.88  Determining the legislature’s intent was of para-
mount importance in deciding this issue, and the Court laid out a test for mak-
ing such a decision, which provided the framework for the Honeycutt court to 
reach its conclusions.89 
Applying the two-part Smith test in Honeycutt,90 the Supreme Court of 
Missouri stated that in determining whether a statute is civil or criminal, it 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 425. 
 81. Id. at 424 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)). 
 82. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 83. Id. at 89-91. 
 84. Id. at 91. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 92. 
 87. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). 
 88. Id. at 105-06. 
 89. Id. at 92-105. 
 90. The Supreme Court of Missouri first adopted and employed the Smith test in 
R.W. v. Sanders.  State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 424 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) 
(citing R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Mo. 2005) (en banc)).  In Honeycutt, the 
9
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“must first ask whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mecha-
nism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the 
other.”91  Importantly, the court noted that while an explicit legislative find-
ing undoubtedly indicated legislative intent, “[o]ther formal attributes of a 
legislative enactment, such as the manner of its codification or the enforce-
ment procedures it establishes, are probative of the legislature’s intent.”92  If 
the court were to find that a statute “create[d] a civil regulatory scheme,” then 
the court would have to proceed to the second prong and “examine whether 
the civil scheme was ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the 
state’s] intention to deem it civil.’”93  The Supreme Court of Missouri then 
repeated the Smith factors used to make such a conclusion: 
To analyze the effects of the regulation, the United States Supreme 
Court examined whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory 
scheme: (1) has been regarded in our history and traditions as a pun-
ishment; (2) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (3) pro-
motes the traditional aims of punishment; (4) has a rational connection 
to a nonpunitive purpose; or (5) is excessive with respect to that pur-
pose.94 
The court then explained that “if the law is deemed ‘civil’ under the ap-
propriate challenge, the court [would] need to analyze whether the law is 
retrospective in its operation” while noting that a law is not retrospective in 
operation “[s]imply because [it] is civil and looks backward.”95 
Utilizing these criteria, the Honeycutt court evaluated the firearm pos-
session statute and found that it was criminal in nature and, therefore, not 
subject to Article I, Section 13’s ban on retrospective laws.96  In so holding, 
the court drew attention to its prior, distinguishable decisions of R.W. v. 
Sanders and Doe v. Phillips, which had utilized Smith and held that Mis-
souri’s sex offender registration statutes were civil in nature97 and that “be-
cause such registration laws were civil and retrospective in their application, 
 
court made clear that any time a defendant challenges a statute as unconstitutional 
based on Article I, Section 13, Missouri courts “should employ the two-part analysis 
utilized in Smith . . . to determine the character of the particular law as the first step in 
analyzing whether a law violates the either ‘[ex post facto]’ provision or the ‘retro-
spective laws’ provision of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 13.”  Id. at 425. 
 91. Id. at 424 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-93). 
 92. Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 94). 
 93. Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 97). 
 94. Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 97). 
 95. Id. at 425. 
 96. Id. at 426. 
 97. Id. at 424.  In its evaluation of the Smith factors in R.W., the court repeatedly 
pointed out that the statute’s principal purpose was the collection of information and 
that the statute did not impose physical restraints or confinements upon convicted sex 
offenders.  R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69-70 (Mo. 2005) (en banc)). 
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they violated Article I, Section 13’s retrospective laws provision” if applied 
to those who were convicted prior to the statute’s effective date.98 
C.  State v. Wade: Assessing a Sex Offender Restriction Statute’s Civil 
or Criminal Status Under the Influence of Honeycutt 
Section 566.150, which the Supreme Court of Missouri interpreted in 
the instant Wade decision, was enacted in 2009.99  It provided that anyone 
who had been convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, one of various sex crimes 
against minors “shall not knowingly be present in or loiter within five hun-
dred feet of any real property comprising any public park with playground 
equipment or a public swimming pool.”100  The first violation of this section 
results in a class D felony,101 which allows a sentence of imprisonment for up 
to four years.102  Any violations after the first one are class C felonies,103 pun-
ishable by imprisonment for up to seven years.104 
This type of statute, which places restrictions on convicted sex offend-
ers’ residences and movements, has “proliferated over the past decade” across 
the country.105  Legislatures typically enact these statutes on public-policy 
grounds, arguing that such laws will prevent future victimizations at the 
hands of prior offenders.106  Unlike the statute found to be civil under the 
Smith test in R.W. v. Sanders, which required mere registration of prior sex 
offenders, statutes like Section 566.150 place physical restrictions on the 
actions and movements of such offenders.107  Although Honeycutt itself dealt 
with a statute restricting firearm possession of felons rather than actions of 
convicted sex offenders, its thorough discussion of retrospective and ex post 
facto laws, together with its consideration of the Smith test, provided the 
 
 98. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 425 (citing Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 852 
(Mo. 2006) (en banc)). 
 99. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.150 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 100. § 566.150.1. 
 101. § 566.150.2. 
 102. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 103. § 566.150.3. 
 104. § 558.011.1(3). 
 105. Daskal, supra note 8, at 328.  For example, in Oklahoma, registered sex 
offenders are prohibited from “living with a minor . . . ; living within 2000 feet of any 
school, childcare center, playground, or park; loitering within 500 feet of any school, 
childcare center, or park; working in any capacity with children; engaging in ice 
cream truck vending; or living in a residence with another convicted sex offender.”  
Id. at 349 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3 
(West 2014) (prohibiting certain sex offenders from knowingly being present in any 
school zone, childcare facility, playground, or public park); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, 
§ 582 (West 2014) (defining class of offenders to whom restrictions apply). 
 106. See Daskal, supra note 8, at 328-29. 
 107. See State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429, 438 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (citing R.W. 
v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Mo. 2005) (en banc)); see also supra note 97. 
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framework for the court to analyze the sex offender restriction statute in 
Wade and decide that Section 566.150 is criminal in nature and therefore is 
not subject to Article I, Section 13’s prohibition on laws retrospective in their 
operation.108 
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
In Wade, the Supreme Court of Missouri, while reaffirming Honeycutt’s 
holding that the retrospective clause of Article I, Section 13 does not apply to 
criminal laws,109 held in a 4-3 decision that Section 566.150 is a criminal 
statute and, therefore, was not subject to Article I, Section 13’s ban on laws 
retrospective in their operation.110 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
Before deciding whether Section 566.150 was criminal or civil, the 
court first addressed the defendants’ argument that Honeycutt was ineffective 
because it relied on Bethurum, which had been overruled by the court in the 
R.L. and F.R. decisions.111  Because the defendant in Honeycutt had raised the 
argument that R.L. and F.R. had overruled Bethurum sub silentio and extend-
ed the ban against retrospective laws to apply to criminal laws, the court 
quoted extensively from that decision, stressing that “the language used and 
authorities cited in each case demonstrate[d] that the Court presumed the 
particular laws invalidated were civil laws without consideration or analysis 
of the issue.”112  Thus, because the court had not determined that the sex of-
fender registration statutes in those cases were criminal in nature, R.L. and 
F.R. could not have extended Bethurum to apply the ban on retrospective 
laws to criminal statutes.113 
The court then considered the critical issue of whether Section 566.150 
was a criminal statute free from application of Article I, Section 13’s ban on 
 
 108. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 432-40.  Although Smith had first been adopted and 
applied by the Supreme Court of Missouri in R.W., Honeycutt – decided in the same 
term as Wade – provided a more expansive discussion of retrospective and ex post 
facto laws than did R.W..  Compare R.W., 168 S.W.3d at 68-69, with State v. Hon-
eycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 414-23 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).  Honeycutt also made clear 
that courts must always apply Smith when considering an Article I, Section 13 chal-
lenge.  Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 425. 
 109. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 432.  Because the court had decided Honeycutt less 
than one month before Wade, it simply restated the key holding and then referred 
readers to Honeycutt for a more thorough analysis of that holding.  See id. 
 110. Id. at 439. 
 111. Id. at 432-33. 
 112. Id. at 434 (quoting Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 423); see supra Part III.B, for a 
more complete analysis of the Honeycutt decision. 
 113. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 433-34. 
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retrospective laws.114  The court began by explaining that it would employ the 
two-part test from Smith as embodied in Honeycutt.115  Accordingly, the court 
would first make a determination as to “whether the legislature intended the 
statute to affect civil rights and remedies or criminal proceedings,” and “[i]f 
the legislature intended to impose punishment,” then the court would not 
need to consider the matter any further.116  Alternatively, “if the Court [were 
to] determine that the legislature intended the law to be civil, [it would then 
have to] determine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive in purpose or 
effect as to negate the intention to affect civil rights or remedies.”117 
Although all members of the court agreed on the relevant test in general 
(i.e., Smith as embodied in Honeycutt), they disagreed as to how much weight 
to afford certain parts of the analysis.  In particular, in listing the criteria to be 
considered in determining legislative intent as to the statute’s civil or criminal 
status, the majority opinion, penned by Judge Zel Fischer,118 indicated that an 
“express legislative finding” or other “formal attributes of a legislative en-
actment, such as the manner of its codification,” should be considered.119  
Then, if necessary, the majority maintained, the other Smith factors should be 
utilized to evaluate whether a civil statute’s scheme was so punitive that it is 
considered criminal.120 
As for the first part of the test, regarding legislative intent, the majority 
began its analysis with heavy reliance not on any express legislative finding, 
but on the formal attributes of a legislative enactment.121  Specifically, the 
majority noted that the statute is located in Title XXXVIII of the Revised 
Statutes of Missouri, named “Crimes and Punishment; Peace Officers and 
Public Defenders,” under a chapter titled “Sexual Offenses.”122  Further, the 
statute itself had been “written in the style of all other provisions of the crim-
inal code” and “use[d] the language of a criminal provision, providing a req-
uisite mental state for the offense” (i.e., “knowingly”) while prescribing a 
felony penalty for a violation.123  In summary, the majority reasoned that 
because violation of the statute “does not depend on a sex offender’s registra-
 
 114. Id. at 435. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Judge Fischer was joined by Chief Justice Mary Russell and Judge Patricia 
Breckenridge.  Id. at 440.  Although Judge Wilson wrote a separate concurrence, he 
also agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of Judge Fischer’s opinion, thus al-
lowing Judge Fischer’s opinion to represent a majority of the court.  See id. 
 119. Id. at 435. 
 120. Id.; see supra Part III.B, for a more detailed explanation of the Smith factors. 
 121. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 436. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 437 (noting in particular that the statute was similar to Section 571.070, 
which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and which the 
court in Honeycutt held was a criminal statute). 
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tion as a sex offender,” and because it carries a “very severe punishment,” the 
legislature intended the statute to be a criminal law.124 
The majority next held that even if the legislature had intended the stat-
ute to be civil in nature, its effect was so punitive that such intent had been 
negated.125  Evaluating the Smith factors, the court first found that that stat-
ute’s purpose, “to punish conduct that necessarily occurs subsequently to the 
conviction of a prior offense,” had been “regarded as punishment throughout 
our history.”126  Second, the majority determined that the statute served two 
of the “traditional aims of punishment,” namely “deterrence of future crimes 
and retribution for past crimes.”127  Third, the majority found that “unlike a 
registration statute that requires only that the defendant register and does not 
prohibit or restrain particular future conduct,” Section 566.150 “impose[d] a 
direct and affirmative restraint on a certain class of defendants,” thus making 
it punitive as opposed to merely regulatory.128  Fourth, but relatedly, the ma-
jority determined that “the rational connection [of Section 566.150] to a non-
punitive purpose is more attenuated than it is with purely sex offender regis-
tration statutes” because Section 566.150 actually punishes and deters con-
duct instead of merely informing the public about sex offenders.129  Finally, 
the majority found that Section 566.150 “is excessive with respect to any 
regulatory purpose” because it “does not aid in the investigation of future 
crimes” by requiring mere registration but instead “creates a new crime for 
those with prior convictions for certain crimes based on certain future con-
duct.”130 
B.  The Concurring Opinion 
Although joining the majority opinion in full, Judge Paul Wilson, joined 
by two other judges, wrote a concurring opinion expressing unease over “the 
[c]ourt’s increased willingness to draw inferences as to legislative intent from 
the codification (i.e., the structure and placement by title, chapter and Sec-
tion) of new provisions enacted by the General Assembly.”131  Judge Wilson 
warned that “[s]uch inferences are of doubtful validity and should be in-
dulged, if at all, only after careful analysis of the codification process and its 
effect on the language actually voted upon and approved by the legisla-
ture.”132 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 438. 
 127. Id. (quoting R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Mo. 2005) (en banc)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 439. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 440 (Wilson, J., concurring).  Chief Justice Mary Russell and Judge 
Patricia Breckenridge joined Judge Wilson’s concurring opinion.  Id.; see also supra 
note 118 (discussing the court’s voting results). 
 132. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 440 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
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The concurrence began by pointing out that the majority had cited R.W. 
v. Sanders, in which the court had applied Smith to a Missouri case for the 
first time, for the premise that codification and location of a statute can have 
probative effect.133  However, the court in R.W. had found that the codifica-
tion of the statute in that case, which was similar to the Wade statute’s codifi-
cation, “was not a reliable indicator” of the legislature’s intent that the stat-
utes were not criminal.134  The concurrence argued that the court’s “increas-
ing[] and unquestioning[] willing[ness] to draw critical inferences” regarding 
the legislature’s intent solely from the location and codification is disconcert-
ing because “[t]he process that newly enacted language undergoes after it 
leaves the General Assembly and before it appears in the Revised Statutes 
precludes any reasonable reliance on placement or structure of a new enact-
ment, standing alone, as indicating anything at all about the General Assem-
bly’s intent regarding that language.”135 
The concurrence pointed out, for instance, that even though the actual 
language of a statute is written by the legislature as a whole, the location of 
statutes and the structure in which the language is published are controlled by 
the Joint Committee on Legislative Research.136  The concurrence then 
claimed that the Supreme Court of Missouri was forsaking its “long and un-
blemished record of refusing to recognize any probative value in the codifica-
tion or structure of legislative enactments on the question of statutory inter-
pretation.”137  For example, the court had previously found that “bold-faced 
headings (or ‘catch words’) assigned to each title, chapter and individual sec-
tion throughout the Revised Statutes are the work solely of [the] codification 
process and, therefore, shed no light whatsoever on the General Assembly’s 
purposes or intent.”138  Additionally, the court had previously “recognized 
that the placement and structure of newly enacted language is no more proba-
tive of the legislature’s intent than the bold-faced headings added to the Re-
vised Statutes by the Committee and the Revisor.”139  Therefore, the concur-
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (citing R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Mo. 2005) (en banc)). 
 135. Id. at 440-41. 
 136. Id. at 441. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (citing State ex rel. Agard v. Riederer, 448 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Mo. 1969) 
(en banc)). 
 139. Id. (citing In re Marshall, 478 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1972) (en banc); Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. N. Kan. City, 367 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Mo. 1963)).  
The committee on legislative research is responsible for publishing laws passed by the 
Missouri General Assembly.  MO. REV. STAT. § 3.010 (Supp. 2014).  In doing so, the 
committee has authority to “renumber sections and parts of sections thereof, change 
the wording of headnotes, rearrange sections, . . .” and make other non-substantive 
changes so long as such changes do not “alter the sense, meaning, or effect of any 
legislative act.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 3.060.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).  The committee ap-
points a “revisor” to carry out these and other necessary and permitted duties.  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 3.070 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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rence cautioned, the court should rely on such codification and location in 
reaching its conclusion only if necessary and done in a comprehensive man-
ner.140 
Nevertheless, the concurrence agreed that, based on an evaluation under 
Smith, Section 566.150 is a statute so punitive that it has criminal effect and, 
therefore, is not subject to Article I, Section 13’s prohibition on retrospective 
laws.141  The concurrence sought instead to stress that, in examining the codi-
fication process, the majority had unnecessarily abandoned the court’s “long-
held skepticism of such a dubious indicator” and given its findings “unwar-
ranted probative value concerning the General Assembly’s intent.”142  Alt-
hough the concurrence stopped short of concluding that such calculations 
were never appropriate, it maintained that such inferences should not be made 
without a “far more compelling case” than had been made in Wade.143 
C.  The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting judges disagreed entirely with the majority,144 contend-
ing that Section 566.150 is a civil law and, therefore, subject to Article I, 
Section 13’s prohibition on laws retrospective in application.145  The primary 
rationale offered by the dissent was that the statute is “part of the unique stat-
utory scheme that has its genesis in the sex offender registrations statutes, 
which [the court had] determined to be, and which clearly are, civil in na-
ture.”146 
The thrust of the dissent’s argument was that the court, following the 
Smith test as first adopted by Missouri by R.W. v. Sanders, must “look at a 
law’s substantive effect rather than its nominal label.”147  The dissent began 
by recounting the decision in R.W., where the court found that a weighing of 
the Smith factors indicated that the Missouri’s sex offender registration stat-
ute was a civil law.148  The dissent went on to explain how the court in R.L. v. 
State of Missouri Department of Corrections had found that Section 566.147 
violated the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of retrospective 
 
 140. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 442 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 141. Id. at 441. 
 142. Id. at 442. 
 143. Id. 
 144. The dissent, authored by Judge George Draper and joined by Judges Laura 
Stith and Richard Teitelman, disagreed with the majority on two grounds.  See id. 
(Draper, J., dissenting).  Because this Note focuses on the evaluation of a statute’s 
civil or criminal status rather than on matters of judicial review and stare decisis in 
general, the first argument – that the majority’s failure to overrule explicitly R.L. and 
F.R. was erroneous – is not discussed in this Part.  See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 443-44. 
 147. Id. at 444. 
 148. Id. 
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laws.149  The dissent pointed out that even though the statute in R.L. did not 
expressly refer to the offender’s registration status or the state’s registration 
list, all of the enumerated sex offenses contained in the statute required com-
pliance with the state’s sex offender registration law.150  Therefore, the statute 
effectively applied only to registered sex offenders.151 
The dissent maintained that because the statute in R.L. was found to be 
unconstitutionally applied as a civil law even though it contained no express 
reference to the sex offender registry, there was support for the argument that 
“the fact that the laws at issue [in Wade] are codified in the portion of the 
statutes governing criminal rather than civil laws does not call for” finding 
Section 566.150 to be criminal.152  The dissent then cited several Missouri 
and U.S. Supreme Court cases upholding the following general proposition: 
“[T]he fact that an act resulted in criminal sanctions if violated was not dis-
positive where it had even broader regulatory effects.”153  The dissent stated 
that the penalty or location of codification was not as important as the fact 
that “all of [the statutes it discussed], including Section 566.150, are designed 
to protect the public from harm and derive from offenders having been re-
quired to register, which has been deemed nonpunitive and civil in nature.”154  
Of course, noted the dissent, “[w]hile it is true [Section 566.150] does not 
require an offender to register . . . [the statute] only captures and burdens 
those individuals required to comply with Missouri sex offender registration 
laws.”155 
Finally, the dissent concluded that because Section 566.150 is civil in 
nature, and because it “clearly imposes a new obligation and duty on sex of-
fenders to locate public parks and public swimming pools within the commu-
nities in which they reside, visit or pass through in Missouri,” the statute, as 
applied to the Wade defendants, violated Article I, Section 13’s prohibition 
on laws retrospective in their operation.156 
V.  COMMENT 
The court provided the correct result in this case, but in reaching its 
conclusion, it unnecessarily relied on the circumstances surrounding the stat-
ute’s codification.  This Part discusses why the majority’s reliance on codifi-
cation elements was weak, why its evaluation of the Smith factors was rea-
 
 149. Id. at 445. 
 150. Id.  The dissent made a similar observation about one of the statutes involved 
in the F.R. decision.  Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. at 445-46. 
 154. Id. at 446 (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. at 446-48. 
 156. Id. at 447-48. 
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sonable, why the dissent’s argument must fail, and why the court’s decision 
may result in uncertainty for advocates bringing similar cases in the future. 
A.  Discerning the Legislature’s Civil or Criminal Intent 
Because all members of the court agreed that Bethurum, as reinforced 
via Honeycutt, distinguished between ex post facto laws and retrospective 
laws and held that the constitutional ban on retrospective laws applies only to 
civil laws, the key issue in this case was whether Section 566.150 is properly 
classified as a civil or criminal law.157  The most problematic part of the ma-
jority’s holding, as the dissent thoroughly pointed out,158 is that it placed far 
too much emphasis on uninformative materials in discerning the legislature’s 
intent.  To be sure, there is precedential support for the majority’s reliance on 
the statute’s codification and its location among other statutes as evidence of 
the legislature’s intent.159  However, rather than first seeking sources more 
indicative of the legislature’s intent, the majority mechanically treated the 
codification evidence as a surefire indicator of such intent.160  Such reliance is 
unpersuasive not only because of the court’s historical reluctance to consider 
that type of evidence as indicative of the legislature’s intent,161 but also be-
cause there was other, more reliable evidence at hand that the majority could 
have used to buttress its holding, including the title of the House Bill from 
which the statute originated.162  Whereas a statute’s location and other aspects 
of the codification process cannot be credited to the entire legislature, the bill 
title must be attributed only to the legislature as a whole rather than to the 
Joint Committee on Legislative Research and the Revisor.163 
Additionally, the majority’s reliance on the statute’s use of “the lan-
guage of a criminal provision”164 offers only weak support for finding that the 
statute is criminal.  Although Section 566.150 indisputably utilizes such lan-
guage, the U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that a legislature “may 
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omis-
sion.”165  Therefore, as the dissent pointed out, the fact that a statute is codi-
fied in the portion of the statutes governing criminal – rather than civil – laws 
is not dispositive of a law being criminal.166  Thus, although the majority had 
some evidence supporting its conclusions regarding criminal legislative in-
tent, none of it was dispositive, and the evidence’s combined probative value 
 
 157. See id. at 432, 434-35 (majority opinion). 
 158. See id. at 442-48 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 159. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 94 (2003). 
 160. See Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 436 (majority opinion). 
 161. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 162. See Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 441 n.1 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. at 437 (majority opinion). 
 165. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 359 (1984) 
(quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)). 
 166. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 445 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
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was insufficient on its own to justify the majority’s finding.167  This seems 
especially obvious in light of the fact that the majority gave in-depth consid-
eration to Smith’s second-prong factors, concluding that any intent from the 
legislature that the statute be civil was negated by its punitive effect.168  Such 
an evaluation begs the question of why the majority even felt it necessary to 
address the statute’s codification circumstances in the first place. 
B.  Excessive Punitive Effect Negates Civil Intention 
Although the majority’s discernment of legislative intent by examina-
tion of the codification process is unpersuasive, based on evaluation of 
Smith’s second prong, the court ultimately reached the correct conclusion.  
Although all such factor-weighing tests are arbitrary to a certain extent, the 
court’s analysis is reasonable given the evidence before it.  In particular, it is 
hard to argue that the State did not seek to deter future crime and pursue ret-
ribution for past crimes or that such goals are not quintessential and tradition-
al aims of criminal punishment. 
Additionally, the majority and dissent agreed that the statute places an 
affirmative burden on a class of defendants.169  The dissent proposed that this 
burden was indicative of a civil statute because the burden is similar to that of 
registering as a sex offender due to conviction for certain crimes and because 
the purpose of such legislation is to protect the public from harm.170  Howev-
er, as the majority countered, Section 566.150’s burden is more punitive be-
cause it mandates, above and beyond mere registration, restrictions on an 
offender’s particular movements and activities.171  Because of this additional 
punitive aspect, and because a law is not civil in nature merely because it has 
a “positive impact on public safety” – indeed, all criminal statutes inherently 
have such an impact – it is reasonable to conclude that the statute is criminal 
in nature.172 
As for the fourth factor, the majority’s argument that the statute has only 
an attenuated connection to a non-punitive purpose is reasonable because 
violators are punished for committing a felony if they fail to adhere to the 
statute’s requirements.173  Unlike sex offender registration statutes, which 
seek to protect the public by providing it with information, the thrust of Sec-
tion 566.150 is to penalize its violators.174  For similar reasons, the majority 
employed sound reasoning when it concluded that the statute’s penalty was 
 
 167. See id. at 445. 
 168. See id. at 437-39 (majority opinion) (discussing and analyzing the instant 
case utilizing the Smith factors, thereby indicating that proof beyond legislative codi-
fication was necessary to support the majority’s ultimate conclusion). 
 169. Compare id. at 438, with id. at 447 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 446-76 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 171. See id. at 438 (majority opinion). 
 172. See id. at 437. 
 173. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.150.2-.3 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 174. See Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 439 (majority opinion). 
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excessive to any regulatory purpose.175  For instance, if the statute’s purpose 
were truly civil and regulatory, then assisting law enforcement and informing 
the public would be sufficient, and no felony punishment would be necessary. 
Although the majority ultimately reached the correct conclusion, the 
dissent raised some important arguments.  At the heart of these arguments is 
the following proposition: because Section 566.150 applies only to convicts 
of certain crimes who would be required to register as sex offenders, the stat-
ute is an extension of the sex offender registry statute, which has been held to 
be civil in nature.176  Therefore, it follows that Section 566.150 must also be 
civil.177 
The argument is reasonable on its face; however, what is conspicuously 
missing from the dissenting opinion is an explicit evaluation of the Smith 
factors that can negate civil intent of the legislature.178  Assuming, for the 
sake of argument, that Section 566.150 had been found to be a civil law under 
the first prong of Smith, the statute would still need to be evaluated under the 
second prong to determine whether its effect was so punitive that it was crim-
inal in nature.  The dissent thought that Section 566.150 was “part of the 
unique statutory scheme that has its genesis in the sex offender registrations 
statutes.”179  However, Section 566.150 is a separate enactment from the gen-
eral sex offender registry statute and must be evaluated as such.  Thus, the 
fact that Section 566.150 applies only to convicts who would be required to 
register as sex offenders is insufficient, on its own, to demonstrate in a dis-
positive way that Section 566.150 is civil.  Because the dissent failed to ex-
plicitly address the factors of Smith’s second prong, it effectively conceded 
that the Smith factors support the majority’s conclusion that the legislature 
had negated any purported civil intent in enacting the statute.  Because the 
majority thoroughly evaluated those factors, and because the evaluation was 
reasonable, its decision was correct.180 
C.  Practical Implications 
Undoubtedly, it is the task of the judiciary to interpret legislative intent 
when considering whether a statute is civil or criminal,181 and there will not 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. at 443-49 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id. at 448. 
 178. See id. at 442-48.  Although the dissent generally compared Section 566.150 
to statutes found to be civil in Smith, R.W., and other cases, it did not specifically 
assess Section 566.150 under each factor of Smith’s framework.  See id. at 443-48. 
 179. Id. at 443. 
 180. This Note makes no comment about whether, as a matter of public policy, 
Section 566.150 and similar statutes are a valuable addition to Missouri’s statutory 
code.  While such a topic merits discussion, it was beyond the court’s decision in 
Wade – which decided merely whether, under the applicable precedents of Smith and 
Honeycutt, such a statute is civil or criminal – and is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 181. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-94 (2003). 
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always be an express declaration from the legislature stating its intent.  The 
problem in this case was that the majority stepped onto shaky ground when it 
relied so heavily on codification as a justification for its decision.  In future 
challenges to the constitutional application of statutes, one potential difficulty 
will be the uncertainty that challengers and advocates face in anticipating the 
weight that codification will carry in persuading the court in its decisions of 
whether a statute is civil or criminal.  Although the majority opinion indicates 
that codification is quite useful in determining the civil or criminal status of a 
statute, the three-judge concurrence indicates that advocates should be wary 
about codification’s influence on the court’s future decisions.182 
In addition to concerns for challengers and advocates, the legislature 
will need to be especially careful in drafting and enacting future statutes if it 
wants them to have a different effect than that which the court gave in Wade.  
If indeed the dissent is correct, and Section 566.150 was intended merely to 
be part of a larger civil regulatory scheme for sex offender registration, then 
the legislature will need to be particularly keen in expressly stating its intent 
for similar statutes to be interpreted as such going forward.  Alternatively, if 
the legislature approves of the court’s decision in this case, then Wade may 
simply be an indicator that Missouri’s sex offender restriction statutes have 
taken on a more punitive slant than the general registration statute. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Because of the Missouri Constitution’s ban on laws retrospective in 
their operation and its applicability only to civil laws, the decision whether 
any given statute has a civil or criminal nature is crucial.  Although the deci-
sion in Wade was a narrow one in that only a single statute’s status as civil or 
criminal was determined, the court’s method for making its decision will 
impact many future cases.  Given the prevalence of sex-offender-related stat-
utes in Missouri and across the nation, future constitutional challenges like 
that in Wade seem all but certain.  Only time will tell whether, in upcoming 
decisions, the Supreme Court of Missouri will full-heartedly embrace Wade’s 
utilization of circumstances surrounding a statute’s legislative enactment 
procedures or whether it will make use of more concrete indicators of legisla-
tive intent. 
 
 182. Wade, 421 S.W.3d at 442 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
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